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Abstract
Credit cooperatives are common institutions today and were
numerous in several European
countries during the nineteenth century. Credit cooperatives were
especially successful in Germany. The
credit cooperatives' success is surprising, given that German
banks were highly developed relatively
early. Why was there any room for another financial institu
tion? One explanation offered by modern
economists for the success of credit cooperatives emphasizes
two features of cooperatives: they can
capitalize on superior information about borrowers and they
can impose relatively severe sanctions on
miscreants. These features permit cooperatives to lend to individ
uals that banks would not want as
customers and to tailor loan terms more closely to borrower's
needs. German cooperators made similar
arguments about the efficiency advantages of cooperatives in the
nineteenth century. This paper uses the
historical business records of several German credit cooperatives
to test this hypothesis. We examine the
lending policies of German credit cooperatives to see whether they
different from banks and other lenders
in ways that suggest more information on borrowers, the ability
to impose more severe sanctions on
borrowers, or both. The results show that a real efficiency advan
tage was at least part of the explanation
for the cooperatives' success.
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Agricultural credit cooperatives were introduced in Germany during the 1850s. By World War
I they were, collectively, a major financial institution. The 18,000 rural credit cooperatives existing in
1913 held some 5 percent of all German banking liabilities. 1 Rural credit cooperatives usually had fewer
than 200 members, limited their operations to a small geographic area, and had no full-time staff. Given
their structure and potential competition from Germany's well-developed formal banking system, the
success of these institutions requires some explanation. Economists and other modern scholars do not
agree on why cooperatives can operate where other financial institutions seemingly cannot, nor did
nineteenth-century Germans agree on why their cooperatives thrived. This paper uses the example of the
German cooperatives to test one popular hypothesis: that cooperatives succeeded because they overcame
problems caused by asymmetric information and enforcement problems in credit markets.
Credit in general and credit cooperatives in particular were the subject of much polemical
discussion at the time. The credit cooperatives' advocates argued that the institutions prospered because
they had an efficiency advantage over banks. The cooperative's efficiency advantage rested, advocates
argued, on a combination of better information about borrowers and the ability to use sanctions not
available to banks. Thus cooperatives could make loans to customers no bank would want, and could do
so on relatively attractive terms. Critics of the cooperatives - and there were many, both in Germany
and elsewhere - traced their growth to a number of other factors, all of which have the common feature
of implying that the cooperative structure had no particular efficiency advantage. Two very common
critiques were that (1) the cooperatives relied on local boosterism in the form of unpaid managerial labor;
and (2) that the cooperatives were essentially patronage devices through which local elites controlled
access to credit for poor people, and with it, their customers, laborers, etc.

1

Bank liabilities (excluding note issue) totaled 65.6 billion Marks. This figure includes the Great
Banks (Kreditbanken), public savings banks (Sparkassen), and the several State-sponsored land banks
(Deutsche Bundesbank [1976:DI Tables 1.01-2.01]).
1

This paper uses the manuscript business records of several German credit
cooperatives to test the
"efficiency" view against a composite alternative hypothesis that will,
here, go under the name of
"control. "2 We test two implications of the efficiency view. First, we see
whether the cooperatives relied
on the practices that banks used to contend with information and enforce
ment problems, such as relying
on short-term loans and frequent renewals. To the extent cooperatives
did rely on these devices, we
cannot sustain the view that their success reflects information and enforce
ment advantages. Second, we
examine the characteristics of borrowers and loan terms to see whethe
r the cooperatives discriminated
across borrowers in ways consistent with variations in the cooperatives'
information and enforcement
advantage. We conclude from this evidence that information and
enforcement advantages were an
important aspect of the cooperative's success, although probably not
the entire story.
A close look at these cooperatives can shed new light on several distinc
t issues in economics and
economic history. First, cooperatives and similar schemes play a large
role in development policy, but
there is little agreement on why they work, and so, it would seem, little
basis knowing when and where
they will work. Economists have suggested several "peer-monitoring"
models, but there is no agreement
that is the right view (e.g., Braverman and Guasch [1989], Stiglitz [1990]
, Varian [1990]). Second, the
theory of asymmetric information now occupies a prominent role
in economic analysis of financial
structure and financial markets. Yet direct evidence on the importance
of asymmetric information is
scarce, and some economists downplay the entire notion (e.g., Berger
and Udell [1992]). Since the
cooperatives were, according to their backers, information machines,
comparing the practices of these
institutions to conventional banks constitutes an indirect test of the asymm
etric information hypothesis
in. rural German credit markets. Finally, German agricultural advanc
es during the latter part of the
nineteenth century were considerable, and certainly play a role in
explaining that country's rise to

2

For the purposes of this paper the alternative hypothesis is simply one
which denies an efficiency
advantage. Guinnane [ 1993] gives closer attention to the alternative
hypothesis.
2

economic prominence prior to World War I. The economic history of German
agriculture in this period
remains to be written, but if cooperators' claims hold any truth, part of this advance
reflects improved
credit conditions for the country's many smallholders.
This paper only hints at two related methodological problems in the
larger project.
Microeconomic analysis of institutions, especially by economic historians, has
convinced many that what
seems like irrational or at least traditional behavior often has a sound econom
ic rationale. For example,
McCloskey [1975] argued that scattering within English open fields was consiste
nt with an effort to
manage risk by diversifying land across micro-climates. This approach to the
analysis of institutions
marked an important advance. Yet much research in this vein suffers from a commo
n weakness: writers
show that a particular institutional arrangement is consistent with some econom
ic model, but make little
effort to demonstrate that the model proposed explains the evidence better than
either other economic
models or previous, non-economic interpretations. That is, there has been little
effort to drawn out the
testable implications of competing explanations of institutions, and to test these
implications against the
available information. Thus we can conclude only that scattering or some other
institution might have
been motivated by risk-aversion. We have no concrete reason to prefer the risk
explanation to any other
argument that is logically coherent. The larger project of which this paper forms
a part seeks to remedy
this weakness, at least for the cooperatives. I am trying to set up alternative
explanations for various
aspects of cooperative design (including, as here, their very success) and to confron
t the implications of
those alternative explanations with the evidence available. Banerjee, Besley, and
Guinnane [In press] is
one variant on this effort. In that paper we compare the comparative-static propert
ies of a formal model
of_the cooperatives to cross-section data on the cooperatives. Here I take a less
formal approach, but the
motivation is similar.
Noting this limitation of earlier research does not mean that it is easy to
test alternative
explanations of an institution's design or operation. However different the
notions underlying two
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alternative explanations might be, they often imply very similar empiri
cal patterns. Moreover, with
historical data the information that could in theory discriminate betwee
n two competing views is often
unavailable or at least sufficiently ambiguous as to make discrimination
imperfect. The tests proposed and
undertaken below, for example, cannot reach entirely unambiguous results
, although they have sufficient
power that when combined with other tests in later research they may
convincingly discriminate among
alternative explanations of the cooperatives. Finally, there is no
reason to expect that any two
explanations of an institution's operations are necessarily mutually incons
istent. For example, in the case
of the cooperatives, the efficiency view may explain how the cooperative
was able to generate a surplus,
while the control view pertains to the distribution of that surplus.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides brief backgr
ound on the history and
organization of the agricultural credit cooperatives in Germany. Section
I also briefly touches on some
aspects of cooperative design and behavior that are considered more
extensively in other parts of the
project. Section II provides background on the manuscript sources and
the cooperative locales. Sections
III and IV draw out the implications of the information view and
test them against the available
information. Section V discusses the cooperatives as alternatives to money
lenders, the other major source
of credit in rural German. Section VI briefly outlines other parts of the
project, and discusses how they
bear on the evidence discussed here.

I. Historical and Organizational Background
Rural credit was a significant problem in Germany during the second
half of the nineteenth
ce~tury. Land reform and emancipation had created a free but underc
apitalized peasantry, and the
agricultural price declines of the 1880s and later left some holdings over-b
urdened with mortgage debt.
Several German states had instituted Sparkassen, or State-backed savings
banks, as well as several types
of land banks and other lending institutions. Yet critics claimed
that neither these institutions nor
4

Germany's Great Banks were prepared to offer reasonable loan terms to small
farmers and to laborers.
Prior to the introduction of credit cooperatives, smallholders and the landless
in Germany depended for
credit on shopkeepers, agricultural dealers, and other informal lenders (Faust [1977:3
28-332]; Vereinjur

Socialpolitik [1883,1887]). Credit conditions in Germany sound similar to those
found in many
developing countries today. Credit was expensive, and many accounts mention
"interlinked mar~ets,"
credit relations that are part of some other transaction (cf. Bell [1988], Besley
[In press]). Totaling
explicit and implicit costs, sober observers claimed that annual interest rates in
excess of 30 percent were
not uncornmon. 3
Responding to these conditions, Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch founded several
cooperative
associations during the 1840s and 1850s. By 1861 there were 364 Schulze-Delitzs
ch credit cooperatives
with nearly 49,000 members (Herrick and Ingalls [1915:2671). By World War
I the German cooperative
movement had three distinct, often quarreling branches. Raiffeisen's first credit
cooperative was founded
in Neuwied (Rheinland) in 1864. Raiffeisen modeled the Neuwied society along
the lines of the Schulze
Delitzsch banks, but later advocated important organizational differences (Raiffei
sen [ 1951]). Schulze
Delitzsch' s cooperatives were addressed to the credit problems of urban artisans
and "handworkers."
Raiffeisen's cooperatives were intended to be, and remained, primarily rural. Wilhelm
Haas later started
a less doctrinaire branch of the cooperative movement that is for our purposes
largely an offshoot of the
Raiffeisen organization. By the end of the nineteenth century Haas' Imperial Federat
ion had admitted the
majority of rural credit cooperatives in Germany. 4 Schulze-Delitzsch coopera
tives were rare in rural
areas, but often served agriculturalists in the absence of rural cooperatives. In
1911 some 29 percent of

3

See the surveys reported in Verein fur Sozialpolitik [1887].

4

All three branche

s are now united into the single organization, Bundesverband der Deutschen
Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken -BVR. Many narratives recount the history of the
German cooperative

banking movement; we are only concerned with the main strands in its develop
ment. See, for example,
Herrick and Ingalls [1915]; Cahill [1913]; Gueslin [1978]; or Faust [1977].

5

the members of Schulze-Delitzsch cooperatives were either farmers or agricultural laborers
(Great Britain
[1914:§311]). The most important distinction dividing credit cooperatives concerned
liability; all
Raiffeisen credit cooperatives and most Haas cooperatives had unlimited liability. Under
the German
cooperative law, any unsatisfied creditor could sue any member of a failed unlimited liability
cooperative
for up to the full amount of outstanding debts. 5
All of the credit cooperatives studied here were of the Haas or Raiffeisen type; all had unlimited
liability and restricted their operations to fairly small, rural areas. The study cooperatives
were for the
most part credit cooperatives only: Many Raiffeisen credit cooperatives engaged in non-cred
it business,
such as purchase and resale of fertilizers. More commonly, however, non-credit cooperat
ives would be
formed with distinct membership and organizational structure, and then join the credit cooperat
ive as a
member. The advisability of "universal" cooperatives was a distinct debate in Germany at
the time, but
need not concern us here.
The Haas and Raiffeisen organizations developed similar supra-local structures. At the
bottom
were the individual cooperative banks. In the middle were regional banks (Centrals)
and associated
regional organizations that provided a number of services such as auditing. The Centrals accepted
surplus
deposits from local cooperatives and made loans to cooperatives needing more funds than
they had on
hand (Jost [1913]). 6 At the top was some type of all-German federation. The federatio
ns set overall
policy for their respective movements (such as whether to accept limited-liability cooperat
ives) and
represented their members in political lobbying. By joining a federation a cooperative agreed
to abide by
certain rules (such as, for Raiffeisen cooperatives, unlimited liability). But each credit
cooperative
retained authority over interest rates, maximum loan sizes, and other policy matters.
Each credit
5

Guinnane [ 1993] gives further detail on differences in German cooperatives. Banerjee, Besley
and
Guinnane [In press] study the implications of liability structure and other organizational
issues.
6

The Raiffeisen cooperatives used as their Central a single institution in Neuwied with
branches
elsewhere.
6

cooperative had three managerial bodies. The management commi
ttee (Vorstana) represented the
cooperative judicially and made most important decisions: accepting
new members, granting loans, etc.
The board of supervision (Aufsichtsrat) met less frequently to overse
e the management committee. The
membership as a whole (Generalversammlung) met annually to elect
the management committee and
board of supervision and to make decisions on basic policies such as interes
t rates. Each cooperative had
a part-time treasurer (Rechner or Rendant) who was paid for his effort. 7
Most rural cooperatives did not
pay any official other than the treasurer.

Cooperatives, Information, and Enforcement
Nineteenth-century claims about cooperatives as information machines
sound curiously modern
in view of the very large literature on asymmetric information in credit
markets. 8 The nineteenth-century
discussions emphasize the fact that managers of banks - even fairly
small, remote branches - cannot
hope to know much about the many smallholders in their region who
might want to borrow from the
bank. A lender who lacks complete information on potential borrow
ers faces the problems of hidden

characteristics, where the lender cannot know if the borrower can or intends to
use the loan in a way that
makes repayment likely; hidden action, where the lender cannot costles
sly watch over the borrower to
make sure he uses the loan wisely; and state verification, where the lender
cannot know whether a failed
borrower lost the investment because of some unwise action or becaus
e of some force (such as weather)
beyond the borrower's control. Information aside, lenders may not be
able to enforce the terms of loan

7

"His" is used advisedly. Some cooperatives forbad females from joining
; most did not permit
females to hold office prior to World War I. The treasurer's annual
pay was linked, implicitly or
explicitly, to turnover, which was probably a reasonable measure of
his effort.
8

Seminal papers include Jaffee and Russell [1976] and Stiglitz and Weiss
[1981]. Hoff and Stiglitz
[1990] and Besley [In press] describe the role of information in develo
ping-country credit markets.
7
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I

contracts. Lenders find ways to overcome these problems, but often the solution is either costly
or makes
the loan terms unattractive to agriculturalists. We discuss these methods, and their drawbac
ks, below.
Raiffeisen and other leaders argued that in a cooperative limited to a small geographic area,
such
as a village or several hamlets, actual and potential members would have considerable knowled
ge of each
other's habits, ·character, and abilities. They could, moreover, impose a wide variety of
economic and
extra-economic sanctions on one another. The Raiffeisen organization reported in 1913
that 80 percent
of its cooperatives were in areas with 3000 or fewer persons (Winkler [1933:651). 9 Peasant
nosiness
forms the basis of the efficiency hypothesis. Fagneux refers to these small villages as places
"where one's
eyes are so attentive to what occurs among the neighbors" (Fagneux [1908:391). In an environm
ent where
people care about and talk about what their neighbors are doing, it would be difficult to
misuse a loan
to engage in some other practice out of the ordinary. Moreover, the cooperative's members
engaged in
similar economic activities, meaning that each would be a good judge of the wisdom of projects
proposed
by others.
In theory the cooperative exploited this information by: (1) Screening: The cooperatives
did not
admit all applicants as members and did not grant loans to all members who applied. (2)
Monitoring:
Hiring a monitor can be expensive, but cooperatives could monitor their borrowers simply
by having
members keep an eye on borrowers and what they were doing with loans. (3) State
verification: A
cooperative's members knew whether a borrower suffered a shock beyond his control or
whether he had
simply used the loan unwisely because they could observe his production decisions and
because all
members were subject to similar weather and other shocks. The cooperative could also have
advantages
in ~nforcement, although this is not strictly an information issue. Because cooperatives were
locally-based
and refused membership to those resident outside their own area, a member ejected from
a cooperative
9

Each cooperative limited itself to a specific area of operation. Sometimes this area was contiguo
us
with a political subdivision, such as one or more Gemeinde; some cooperatives studied
here limited
themselves to parishes.

8

was cut off from any cooperative credit. Equally costly was the public knowle
dge of the reason for this
dismissal in his own village. In addition, the cooperative combined individu
als who had many other
relationships with one another. Sanctions could be applied in dimensions unrelate
d to the cooperative. If
someone cheated the cooperative, his neighbors might refuse to sit next to him
at church or to socialize
with him. A bank, in contrast, could at most refuse future credit to a defaulti
ng borrower.
The cooperative's ability to gather and use information was enhanced conside
rably by an
important feature of its membership: at any one time borrowers were ordinarily
a minority of cooperative
members. Why did people join a credit cooperative? The simplest answer would
be so that they could
have access to cheaper credit. But this answer would not be entirely accurate
, as Table 1 shows for the
two cooperatives with this information currently available. 10 Many members
waited a long time before
taking a loan, and many never borrowed at all. Why join a cooperative if you
do not need credit? Two
reasons seem most likely. Many cooperatives were located in areas remote
from alternative savings
institutions such as Sparkassen. Joining the cooperative conferred important econom
ic advantages such
as the right to participate in monitoring the use of deposits (that is, loan policy)
and in setting deposit
interest rates. The presence of non-borrowing members might have been importa
nt to preventing collusive
arrangements among borrowers; the village was filled with people with every
incentive to report unwise
use of credit. 11 Even in situations where other savings institutions were as conveni
ent as the cooperative,
some individuals may want to contribute to local economic development by making
their

savings available

to their poor neighbors, via the cooperative. This second motivations has
several versions. Some

10

The data used to compile Table 1 are explained in the next section.
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The German agricultural credit cooperatives' attractiveness as savings instituti
ons was, I have
argued elsewhere, one of the keys to their success (Guinnane [In press]). This
comment is not meant to
suggest that only non-borrowing members could provide the right incentives
for such a credit scheme.
Besley and Coate [1992] model group-lending schemes (such as Bangladesh's
famous Grameen Bank) in
which borrowers have incentives to monitor each other because the lending scheme
provides credit on
much better terms than any alternative.
9

depositors may be simple altruists. Others may profit from better
credit conditions for the poor; a
shopkeeper may prefer that potential customers to spend less of their
income on interest payments to a
moneylender and more on his goods. One version of the "control"
view suggests a less benign reason.
If a single deposi tor owns a large fraction of the cooper ative's
workin g capital, he may be able to
intimidate the -Vorstand with threats to withdraw those funds, and
so exercise control over his laborers
and others.
So far we have discussed information advantages and enforcement advant
ages as if they were the
same thing, which they are not. By enforcement problems we mean
simply that should the borrow er fail
to use the loan in the stipulated way or fail to repay the loan, the lender
would find it prohibitively costly
or even impossible to recove r the sum through judicial means. Inform
ation and enforcement problems
are closely related, however. Even if sanctions were costless a lender
might not always apply them in the
presence of information imperfections. Most lenders are concerned
to appear "fair," to refrain from
applying sanctions to borrow ers who could not repay for reasons beyond
their control. We will consider
the implications of the difference between information and enforce
ment advantages in section V below.

II. The Sources
The central empirical source for this project consists of material taken
from the business records
of several German cooperatives for the late nineteenth and early twentie
th centuries. Figure 1 is a locator
map of Germany, showin g both the towns containing the Raiffei
senbanks and several large cities for
reference purposes. 12 Thus far cooperatives pertaining to five Raiffei
senbanks have been studied: one
ea~h in Diestedde and Leer, which are located in Munsterland; one
in Hatzfeld, which is in north Hessen;

12

The study cooperatives are all located in the former West Germa
ny. This is not accidental.
Cooperatives were, in fact, more common in western Germany during
the nineteenth century. More
importantly, the Bundesverband does not have within its membership,
at least as of now, any surviv or
of the cooperatives located in the former East Germany.

several cooperatives located in and around the town of Schmelz, in the Saarlan
d; and several cooperatives
in and near the town of Maulburg, in southern Baden. The records of
a sixth Raiffeisenbank, in
Rheinbach, have not yet been exploited extensively yet. Diestedde and
Leer have a single credit
cooperative's records in their possession. The other Raiffeisenbanks have
material from several
cooperatives. Where necessary for clarity these cooperatives will be referred
to throughout this paper by
their own name and that of the Raiffeisenbank; for example, Limbach (Schme
lz).
Each cooperative was required by law and by federation rules to keep
certain records.
Cooperatives kept minutes of meetings and day-to-day balance books and prepare
d financial and statistical
reports for the regional auditing organization. There were, however, no
legal requirements that
cooperatives deposit their old records with any public archive, so records
survive only because the
individuals associated with a particular cooperative made that happen. Few
cooperatives had buildings
or even quarters dedicated to their use before the 1950s. The surviving records
were simply kept in the
treasure r's home. The Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeis
enbanken - BVR arranged
access to all of the material used. The Bundesverband sent a copy of a brief
description of the research
proposal to each of their regional organizations, which in turn contacted their
Raiffeisenbanks. 13
The incomplete survival of cooperative records raises the possibility that the
records available
would not yield a balanced view of the cooperatives actually in operation during
the nineteenth century.
What those biases might be is unclear. Record survival depended on persona
l actions of cooperative and
later bank officials, war damage, etc. Survivo r bias could be a problem, althoug
h not as great as it might
seem. Some unsuccessful early cooperatives simply wound up their business,
while others were merged
wi_th larger, neighboring institutions. Thus the records currently on hand at
surviving Raiffeisenbanks

13

At one time the term Volksbank denoted a Schulze-Delitzsch institution, and Raiffeis
enbank denoted
an institution based on Raiffeisen or Haas principles. With the reorganization
of cooperatives since
World War II, the distinction has lost its meaning. Many present-day Volksba
nken selected that name
because it lacks the rural connotation of Raiffeisenbank.
11

include material pertaining both to their direct ancestor (which at least survived) and to other
cooperatives
that folded or were taken over by their more successful counterparts. 14 At any rate, these
sources just
do not permit intensive study of a random sample of credit cooperatives. In the larger project
I address
this problem in two ways. First, I use published material to compare certain characteristics
of the study
cooperatives to all cooperatives in that region, and, to the extent possible, to verify conclusi
ons reached
using the manuscript information. Second, hundreds of Raiffeisenbanks have commissioned
bank histories
for their 75th or 100th anniversaries. These bank histories are brief and of very uneven quality,
but since
they often focus on unusual features of their institution's history they yield some feel
for broader
cooperative behavior. Since this research is still in progress, not all information located
has been
assembled into a form useable at this stage. And as this project progresses, additional high-qua
lity records
may come to my attention.

The Cooperatives Studied
Guinnane [1993] reports detailed background information on the cooperative locales. For
our
purposes a simple characterization suffices. With the exception of Schmelz all
locales were
overwhelmingly agricultural. Many workers in the Schmelz area were miners but had small
farms as by
employments. Diestedde had the largest farms, averaging nearly 10 hectares, while
farms in Leer
cooperative were smaller at 6 hectares. Hatzfeld had the smallest farms (outside Schmelz
) at about 3.5
hectares on average. Hatzfeld lies in a mountainous region and was almost certainly the
poorest of the
study areas. 15 Table 2 reports membership sizes and assets per member for the four cooperat
ives for
14

For example, the Miel cooperative was later absorbed into the Rheinbach Raiffeisenbank.
The Miel
cooperative was quite badly managed and had to wind up its business, but its records have
been preserved
because of its absorption into the more successful institution.
15

Maulburg was not in Prussia and so the same statistical information is not (as yet) available
. This
region lies at the southern end of the Black Forest, along the Swiss border. It figures
little in the
discussion below.
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which this information is available. Although all cooperatives shared similar characteristics,
there was
important heterogeneity in membership size and in assets: the Hatzfeld cooperative started
out with more
members than most, while the Diestedde cooperative's assets distinguished it from other
cooperatives.
Only one cooperative's records consistently report member occupations. This information,
for Diestedde,
is reported in Table 3. Kolon and Kotter are local terms denoting a large farmer (one who
hires labor)
and a small farmer (one who has land but also hires himself out), respectively.

The Diestedde

cooperative was founded by agriculturalists, but later attracted non-agriculturalists. Bank
histories and
other accounts suggest that this was a fairly typical pattern for rural credit cooperatives.
The records actually available for each cooperative are not identical. Three factors are
most
important in creating differential information. First, some cooperatives saved some books
and not others.
Second, the individuals taking minutes of meetings had different habits. For example,
sometimes the
person keeping minutes for the Vorstand would record the purposes of loans, but often not.
Since printed
forms were rarely used for this purpose, the information is not always uniform. Third,
some of the
information comes from printed forms that were the basis of reports to the Central or auditing
federation.
Different auditing federations requested different information. All this being said, it should
be noted that
the information most important to this research was checked by an auditor who sometim
es found, and
corrected, errors. The information may be available only unevenly, but the information
we do have is
of high quality.

III. Testing the Efficiency View I: Lending Policy
Economists and economic historians have argued that some features of financial institutions,
such
as their organization or their loan policies, reflect their lack of complete information
on borrowers.
Observers of agricultural credit in nineteenth-century Europe often noted that the loan
policies of
commercial banks made them institutions unsuited to solving the problems of small farmers
and the

13
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agricultural poor. Banks' defenders argued that the policies blamed were sound business
practice,
especially when dealing with poor people whom the bank did not know well or with whom
the bank
might have difficulty enforcing loan terms. The banks' critics in the cooperative moveme
nt pointed to
two policies in particular, reliance on short-term lending and the requirement that larger loans
be secured
by collateral, usually land. Short-term lending permits the lender to monitor the loan's
use and the
borrower's condition. A borrower may effectively have a loan for three or four years, but
by requiring
that he renew the loan every three months, the lender can satisfy himself of the borrowe
r's condition.
Schulze-Delitzsch cooperatives, in fact, explicitly limited loans to three months as a way
of keeping tabs
on the borrower's situation (National Monetary Commission [1911:456]). Short-term loans
were almost
a point of orthodoxy among nineteenth-century bankers, and were, as Lamoreaux [1991]
shows for the
U.S., a reaction to a poor information environment. 16 Short-term lending entails several
costs for
borrowers, costs that are particularly severe for agriculturalists. First there is the cost of renewing
a loan
every three months. The borrower had to pay transportation costs and lose work time in travellin
g to the
bank's offices. These costs were even higher if the loan had a co-signer who also had to
visit the bank
office to renew the loan. Second, loan renewals discouraged illiquidity (which is why
lenders liked
renewals), but by so doing discouraged agricultural borrowers from investing in long-term
projects that
could raise their incomes.
Collateral functions as a screen and gives a borrower better incentives to work hard and
to use
safe technologies. Requiring collateral also has its costs. Some costs are explicit, such
as the costs of
registering the mortgage with the authorities. Moreover, many of those the cooperative
movement was

16

Short-terming lending was also advocated by German bankers as the only practical way
to avoid
liquidity problems. The actual term-structure of lending by German banks has been difficult
to pin-down.
The Deutsche Bank's consolidated balance sheet for 1907, to take one example, shows about
80 percent
of its assets in short-term lending (National Monetary Commission [1911]). The
more relevant
competition for cooperatives would be the smaller banking houses - so-called Privatba
nkiers - for
whom no balance sheets have been as yet located.
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most interested in serving had little or nothing in the way of assets a
formal financial institution could
accept as security. And, as noted above, some German landholders had
land that was already heavily
mortgaged by the time cooperatives came on the scene.
The lending policies of agricultural credit cooperatives suggest that inform
ation and enforcement
were not serious problems: they made long-term loans, and while
collateral was used, it was
comparatively rare. Long-term loans were in fact an important reason
for having cooperatives, their
leaders thought, and without belaboring the point we can use quantitative
information to show that the
cooperatives fulfilled this part of their mission. Table 4 summarizes
the duration of loans outstanding
from the Leer cooperative for selected years. In its early years the cooper
ative relied more heavily on
short-term loans, but by 1909 some 40 percent of its loans were
for 20 or more years. And the
cooperative's "short-term" loans were, in comparison, long-term; comme
rcial banks typically relied on
90-day loans, while most of these Leer loans were for 6 months to
a year. Analysis of the Raiffeisen
federation's annual reports shows something very similar; the preponderanc
e of loans were made for one
year or longer, with nearly half made for 10 years or longer. Table 5
shows that this preponderance of
long-term loans was not limited to a single cooperative; for the Raiffei
sen federation as a whole, long
term loans were the norm.17

Security for Loans

Loans not made on collateral were rarely unsecured. Cooperatives relied
on one of two forms
of security. "Personal" security to us means that a co-signer (usuall
y but not always a cooperative
member) agreed to guarantee the borrower's promissory note to the
cooperative. The co-signer in fact
17

Some critics who took the "control" view noted that these long-term loans
were subject to 3-month
recalls and argued that the threat of such recalls deterred borrowers from
actually investing the funds in
long-term projects. The recalls (and threats of recalls) in the manus
cript records do not suggest that
action was ever taken except in cases of clear abuse of loan terms. See
Guinnane [1993] for discussion
of this evidence.
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played three roles: He acted as a further screen, since if he thought the borrower unreliabl
e he would not
co-sign the note; he had an increased incentive to monitor the borrower during the loan's
life; and the
co-signer's own assets were, in effect, pledged to make good the loan should the borrowe
r not repay.
Reliance on co-signers implies considerable information about the borrower and the co-signe
r, and the
ability to enforce loan terms with at least one. Cooperatives were not alone in using co-signe
rs to s~cure
loans, but the identity of these co-signers was quite different from those accepted by formal
financial
institutions. Commercial banks often lent money on two signatures, but in that case at least
one was a
wealthy individual, often with substantial sums on deposit at the bank. The bank did not
need to know
much about the borrower or the co-signer; it had the co-signer's deposit as security for the
loan. Bank's
reliance on wealthy co-signers meant that to obtain credit the borrower would have to approach
someone
his social and economic superior. Accounts mention that co-signers extracted some surplus
from the
relationship, insisting that the borrower make up their lost time with free labor and sometim
es using the
threat of not signing a renewal note to gain other advantages. Co-signers for cooperative
loans tended to
be much poorer. In one case in Rheinbach, for example, two laborer brothers borrowed
50 Marks each
and co-signed each other's loans. 18
Collateral security was usually land and buildings. Reliance on collateral for loans varied
across
time and across cooperatives, but none relied on it very heavily. The Hatzfeld cooperative
made virtually
no loans on collateral security during the period covered. Other study cooperatives did make
such loans,
but they were never a majority of all loans. In Diestedde, for example, about 60 percent of
all loans made
during the study period were secured by a co-signer only. The national data for the Raiffeise
n federation
in.Table 5 tell a similar story. Loans made on collateral tended to be larger than other
loans, but the
records contain significant numbers of very large loans made on personal security. The mean
size of loans
backed by co-signers in Diestedde was 1526 Marks, compared to 2676 Marks for loans on
collateral, but
18

Protokollbuchfi).r den Vorstand, Oberdrees (Rheinbach), March 19th, 1909.
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there was considerable overlap in two distributions. Twenty-five percent of co-signer loans
in Diestedde
were for 1500 Marks or more.
Cooperative leaders often implied that they restricted loans to productive purposes on the grounds
that these loans were most easily monitored and most likely to be repaid. While
interpreted by
contemporaries as reflecting the role of information in the cooperative's operation, this
policy - were
it enforced - might simply reflect the relative difficulty of screening as opposed to monitori
ng. The
manuscript records sometimes mention the purpose for which a loan was granted. Unfortun
ately, this
information was not always given, and in some contexts it seems the loan's purpose was
mentioned
because it was noteworthy. In one case, however, the cooperative used a printed form
that included a
space for loan purpose. This produces a more complete run of information, summarized in
Table 6. Many
of these loans were clearly not for productive purposes. And how could one monitor a loan
used to pay
off old debts? On the other hand, if the cooperative movement's claims were accurate, then
permitting
new members to pay off old debts to moneylenders by taking on low-cost cooperative loans
would be a
certain way to raise incomes. The cooperative's willingness to make loans to a member
so he can pay
off another debt may reflect the cooperative's knowledge of this member and confidence
that loan terms
can be enforced.

IV. Testing the Efficiency View II: Loan Characteristics
A second way to test the efficiency view is to examine the characteristics of the loans cooperat
ives

made. The efficiency view implies that individuals for whom the cooperative has better informat
ion and
more potent sanctioning ability receive better loan terms. How would this behavior
differ from
conventional lenders, such as a bank? One would expect that any financial institution would
adjust its loan
terms to reflect the borrower's characteristics. The point of this second level of analysis which is only
meaningful in the context of the discussion of the previous section, which showed the basic
difference
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in cooperative lending policy - is twofold. First, an extreme version of the control view
would hold that
cooperatives did not discriminate across borrowers at all. We might not be able to
distinguish the
cooperative from a bank in this regard, but we can evaluate the basic claim. Second, and
more specific
to the cooperative, if the cooperative does indeed discriminate across borrowe rs, then
we have an
explanation for its ability to depart from conventional banking practice as documented
in the previous
section.
To conduct this analysis we draw on an important feature of the cooperatives' records:
although
they do not always state a member 's occupation, they almost always state where he Lives.
A member
could live either in the town where the cooperative was located and where the large
majority of its
members lived, or he could live elsewhere in its operating region, perhaps in another
small town. We
have sufficient data to exploit this information for the Diestedde and Hatzfeld cooperatives.
The Diestedde
cooperative was formally located in Diestedde and Siinnighausen, two small towns less than
4 kilometers
apart. About 60 percent of the members lived in Diestedde and another 31 percent in Siinnigh
ausen. The
other members of the Diestedde cooperative lived in two other tiny towns or in the countrys
ide. The
Diestedde cooperative's Vorstand alternated its meetings between Diestedde and Siinnigh
ausen. Some 75
percent of the Hatzfeld cooperative's members lived in that town. The underlying presump
tion is that
individuals who live in the main town (or towns) were better-known to other members and
their activities
could be better supervised. Someone who lives even a short distance out of town
-

for these

cooperatives, it can hardly be more than 5 or 6 kilometers - cannot be nearly so well
known, nor can
his use of a loan be so easily monitored. In addition, the economic and extra-eco
nomic sanctions
di~cussed above would have more force for individuals who are in closest proximity to other
cooperative
members. Someone who lives mid-way between Diestedde and another small town might,
if ejected from
the Diestedde cooperative, be able to transfer his social and business connections to
the other town
(although he could not expect to join the other town's cooperative).

18

What would be the characteristics of a loan whose borrower was well-known to
the cooperative?
Two implications are directly testable. First, we would expect that - conditio
ning on other things such
as loan size -

borrowers who are more familiar to the cooperative would be less likely
to pledge

collateral, both because of their own traits and because an individual who
is well-known to the
cooperative would have an easier time finding an acceptable co-signer. In fact,
"well-known" for these
purposes applies equally to the borrower and those whom he knows as possible

co-signers. The same goes

for enforcement. Second, we would expect that only borrowers familiar to the
cooperative could take the
very small loans cooperators saw as the entire point of the institution. Only
a larger loan would be
worthwhile if there was any fixed cost to providing information to the coopera
tive.

Loan Security
Table 7 reports binary probit regressions that test the first hypothesis. The depende
nt variable is
one if the loan is secured by something other than a co-signer. We find that larger
loans are more likely
to require collateral, which is not surprising. The cooperative came to rely more
heavily on collateral
security as time progressed. This change reflects both relaxing of attitudes by coopera
tive federations and
increased familiarity with the legal requirements of mortgage registration. Holding
constant loan size,
neither occupation nor being an original member of the cooperative affects security 19
. What does affect
security is where a member lives. Those who live outside the two main towns
are much more likely to
have to pledge collateral. This result does not reflect the greater landholdings
of those who live outside
the town. We have controlled for occupation in Diestedde, and in both Diested
de and Hatzfeld many
l~dhold ers lived in the main town. The same seems to apply to Siinnighausen
- which is not consistent
with our hypothesis - although the coefficient's magnitude is much smaller.
Re-estimating the equation
for farmers only, as in the second set of columns in Table 7, shows that the Siinnigh
ausen result reflects
19

The Kolon and Kotter variables are being used to distinguish between two classes
of farms.
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the sensitivity of this variable to the definition of the occupational categories.
Experimentation with
alternative classification of non-farming members shows that the basic result
is robust.
Evaluating the probabilities implied by the regressions in Table 8 shows the magnitu
de of these
place-of-residence effects. Consider a 2000 Mark loan made to a Kolon or large
farmer. If he lived in
Diestedde, the ·probability of having mortgage security for the loan is 67 percent
; in Siinnighausen, 74
percent; and elsewhere, 85 percent. For smaller loans the effect is somewhat more
pronounced. A Kotter
borrowing 500 Marks would pledge security with 43 percent probability if
he lived in Diestedde, 50
percent if he lived in Siinnighausen, and 65 percent if he lived outside of either
town. That is, the place
of-residence effects are about as large as the occupation effects. This is large
indeed; the difference
between a Kolon and a Kotter, after all, is that the former has much more wealth. 20

Loan Sizes
By observing that imperfect information acts like a fixed cost, we note that the
better individuals
are known to the cooperative, the more likely they are to take small loans.
Table 8 exploits this
observation to test the implications of place-of-residence for loan size. The estimati
on equation underlying
the regressions in Table 8 cannot be assigned a structural interpretation, since we
do not know how many
loans did not take place because the fixed cost made the cooperative's terms unattrac
tive to the borrower.
We report only quantile (median) regressions; ordinary least-squares estimates
gave qualitatively similar
results but are sensitive to the inclusion or exclusions of a small number of outliers
.
For both Diestedde and Hatzfeld, loans are larger if it was the member's first
loan (which, for
many, is their only loan), later in the cooperative's existence, or if the borrow
er was a Kolon or artisan.
/

What is particularly striking is that loans are much larger for members who do
not live in the main town.
20

Evaluations are for the second regression; the differences cited in the text are
similar for the first
regression. Evaluations assume an original member taking a loan during the
cooperative's fifth year of
operation.
20

The effect is very large for both Diestedde and Hatzfeld. 21 The very small loans
for which the
cooperatives were intended were more common for those who lived in town. Given
that we have
controlled for occupation in Diestedde, this result should not reflect occupationally-based
differences in
credit needs for those who live in town versus those who live outside. 22 Clearly there
was some fixed
cost of borrowin g, a cost that deterred small borrowers from relatively remote areas. Taken
by itself, the
regression reported in Table 8 might not be entirely convincing: Any fixed cost of
borrowin g could
produce this result. Other fixed costs that come to mind, such as the need to travel to
town to apply for
the loan, seem less plausible, however. These are very short distances to travel. Most
people living
outside the towns would have to make regular trips there to attend church, to purchase
supplies, etc. The

Vorstand ordinarily met after work hours, posing little additional inconvenience to those who might
have
to walk or ride a horse to town. The difference between those who lived in the main town
and those who
did not lies not in their costs of getting to town, but in their familiarity to other cooperat
ive members.

V. Cooperatives, Banks, and Moneylenders
Thus far the paper has relied two expositional shortcuts. We have pretended that the cooperat
ives'
only competition came from formal financial institutions such as banks. This was not entirely
true, at least
at first; Raiffeisen himself saw the cooperative as a way to fight the power of moneyle
nders. We have
also made little effort to distinguish between the cooperat ive's possible informational
advantages and its

21

In this case, the Siinnighausen dummy is not sensitive to redefinitions of the occupatio
nal
categories.
.
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The result is probably stronger than indicated by the regressions. The data used in these
regression
exclude loans made on laufende Rechnung, a form of overdraft used by some town-dwelling
shopkeepers,
artisans, and others. Precise balances for these loans are not usually available, but when
available they
are quite large; the limits are often 8 or 10 thousand Marks. That is, the data do not
include some very
large loans granted to individuals who lived in the towns.
21

possible enforcement advantages over other lenders. Here we abandon both shortcuts and
briefly discuss
the role of moneylenders and enforcement.
The literature on moneylenders is both polemical and relies heavily on anecdotes. The
closest
thing to a survey is the information summarized in two reports of the Verein fii,r
Socialpolitik
[1883, 1887]. These reports suggest that most moneylenders would live in the commun
ities where they
practiced their trade, but were usually despised by their neighbors. 23 To the extent this
was true, we
would expect the moneylender to have slightly poorer information than a cooperative
(he lived in the
community, but only had one set of eyes and ears) and much worse enforcement capabilit
y than a
cooperative. Who would shun his neighbor for failing to repay someone the community did
not like? Thus
it seems likely that if cooperatives had an efficiency advantage over rural moneylenders,
it was due to
their enforcement capability more than any informational superiority.

VI. Other Questions for Research
This paper raises or refers to a number of questions that must be investigated in future
research
or that form part of the larger project. We have noted here a number of gaps or weaknes
ses in the
evidence presented here. One troubling weakness in the regression estimates reported
above is lack of
wealth data for cooperative members, farmers especially. At the beginning of the research
, bank officials
assured me that tax information for this period had survived. That appears not to be the
case, although
the issue is being pursued. There may be other proxies for at least farm size that
would help to
distinguish more cleanly between borrowers of different wealth.
There are several other ways to approach this efficiency-versus-control question.
We can
investigate the role of the cooperative as a thrift institution. Lamoreaux [1991: 161] notes
that a financial
intermediary faces two sets of information problems: its depositors are not fully informed
about bank
23

Some of this ill-feeling was simple prejudice; many but not all of the moneylenders were
Jewish.
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policy, and the bank cannot be fully informed about its actual and potential borrowers. In this paper we
have focused on the second problem, but the first is also important. The intermediary may have to adopt
a deposit system that helps imperfectly-informed depositors police the intermediary's managers' behavior,
which is the point made by Calomiris and Kahn [1991]. If it does not adopt such policies then we have
evidence to suggest that at least its depositors do not face significant information problems. 24

If the cooperatives did not have an efficiency advantage over banks, then their interest rates and
other policies must have owed something to the willingness of their managers to work without pay. This
raises a useful counter-factual question: could a bank have had the cooperative's lending policies, paid
market wages to its employees, and still survived? Preliminary efforts to evaluate this question, reported
in Guinnane (1993), suggest a qualified "yes." The calculations simply impute wages to the cooperative's
unpaid staff and subtract those labor costs from the actual net revenue. In cooperative's early years the
counter-factual institution suffered losses, but quickly earned a small profit. These preliminary findings
cast doubt on one critique of the efficiency view, but clearly require more research.

VII. Summary
Credit cooperatives thrived in nineteenth-century Germany, despite the existence of very well
developed formal banking institutions. From their geographic distribution and the characteristics of their
memberships it is evident that the cooperatives filled a niche where other formal financial institutions
could not compete. Cooperative advocates claimed that the cooperatives could lend to poor people and
on more attractive terms, because the institutions harnessed the superior information on borrowers that
was available to those living in small rural villages.
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Charles Calomiris has pointed out that cooperatives did not have demandable debt, which would
suggest - according to Calomiris and Kahn [1991) - that depositors had very good information on the
cooperative.

23

This paper uses business records of historical credit cooperatives to test this proposition in
two
ways. We find that cooperatives did not rely on common lending practices, such as short-ter
m lending,
that reflected information and sanctions constraints for banks. That is, the cooperatives did
away with
some lending policies that made banks costly and inconvenient for smallholders, and that
have been
identified as reflecting informational constraints. We also find that those best known to the
cooperative
received the best loan terms and could take much smaller loans. This evidence suggests that
information
was, in fact, a central feature of the cooperatives' success.
This evidence does not, by itself, settle the issue of the reason for the cooperatives' success.
Our
own exploitation of the available information remains incomplete. Moreover, the alternativ
e hypotheses
are not fully inconsistent with the information view. The cooperative structure could well
have had
efficiency advantages that were not by themselves sufficient to explain the movements' success.
The more
complete story awaits additional research.
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Table 1
Life-table Estimates of How Rapidly New Members Take their First Loan
Cooperative and Type
of Member

Number
of
members

Proportion not having taken a loan, and
standard error, after belonging to the
cooperative for
6 months

2 years

5 years

Diestedde Cooperative
All members

282

.56
(.03)

.49
(.03)

.45
(.03)

Members who joined
in first year

53

.92
(.04)

.73
(.06)

.70
(.06)

Members who joined
after the first year

229

.47
(.03)

.43
(.04)

.39
(.03)

Occupation: Kolon
(Large farmer)

61

.77
(.05)

.67
(.06)

.62
(.06)

Occupation: Kotter
(Small farmer)

115

.48
(.05)

.42
(.05)

.38
(.04)

Hatzfeld Cooperative
All members

163

.36
(.04)

.25
(.04)

.20
(.04)

Members who joined
in first year

49

.24
(.06)

.10
(.04)

.02
(.02)

Members who joined
after the first year

113

.44
(.05)

.37
(.05)

.35
(.05)

Source: Computed from PB Vor Diestedde and PB Vor Hatzfeld
Notes: Some observations censored by the end of coverage. All other
observations censored at 60 months.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 2
Membership Size and Assets, Study Cooperatives
Selected Dates
Indicator

Year Founded

Cooperatives
Diestedde

Leer

Hatzfeld

Limbach
(Schmelz)

1883

1891

1892

1901

Number of Members:
In year founded

51

57

111

40

After 5 years

80

93

168 (b)

123

After 10 years

87

125

187

142

After 15 years

(No data)

147

187

N.A.

After 20 years

(No data)

N.A.

200

N.A.

151

164 (a)

200

140

In 1914

Assets per Member:
In year founded

0.85

0.27

0.07

0.25

After 5 years

1.92

0.99

0.40

0.76

After 10 years

2.68

1.49

0.70

1.38

After 15 years

(No data)

1.94

0.98

N.A.

After 20 years

(No data)

2.53

1.54

N.A.

6.07

2.68

1.57

In 1914

1.37
Source: Rechnung und Bilanz for each cooperative; Diestedde membership figure
at 20 years comes from
the PB GVer, Diestedde.
Notes: "N.A." denotes not applicable because cooperative founded too late.
Assets are in thousands of Marks.
(a) Figure for 1913, 1914 data missing.
(b) Previous year, data missing.
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Table 3
Occupations of Members of the Diestedde Cooperative
(Percentage of all Members)
Occupations

Members who joined in:
1883

1884-1890

18911900

19011914

All members·
1883-1914

Kolon (large farmer)

36.2

19.3

11.3

16.0

18.1

Kotter (small farmer)

32.8

50.0

48.4

30.0

44.3

White collar worker

12.1

4.8

9.7

7.0

4.6

Artisan

8.6

12.9

16.1

25.0

17.0

Laborer

0.0

0.0

4.8

7.0

3.5

Publican

5.2

8.1

4.8

3.0

5.0

Occupation not given in
sources

5.2

4.8

4.8

12.0

7.4

Total number of members

58

62

62

100

282

Source: PB Vor, Diestedde.
Notes: Coverage is from foundation in 1883 through 1914.
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Table 4
Loan Durations, Leer Cooperative, Selected Years
(Original Duration of Loans Outstanding in that Year)
Year

Percentage of all loans originally granted for:
Less than 1
year

2-5 Years

5-20 Years

20 or
more
years

Number of
loans

1892

36.4

36.4

24.2

3.0

33

1895

10.3

44.1

35.3

10.3

68

1900

6.7

33.3

21.2

38.8

165

1905

3.1

18.0

47.7

31.1

289

1909

8.1

21.9

28.7

41.3

247

Source: Leer R & B
Notes: Selection of years dictated by years in which this part of the form was filled out.
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Table 5
Loan Terms for Cooperatives i.n the Raiffeisen Federation, 1901
Regions

Percent of
Loans w/o
Collateral

Loan durations:
1-10
Years

10 or
More
Years

Bavaria

67.8

59.2

31.5

Pfalz, Baden, and Hessen (Grand Duchy)

60.9

83.2

11.0

Brandenburg, Pommerania, and Mecklenburg

74.8

59.3

24.6

All Germany

76.9

70.3

20.8

Source: Computed from annual reports of the Raiffeisen federation and regional sub-fed
erations.
Note: Collateral data expressed as percentage of loans; duration as percentage of loans
weighted
by original amount. This is how the reports give the information.
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Table 6
Stated Purpose for Loans Granted by the Limbach (Schmelz) Cooperative, 1906-1914
Purpose

Number of
Loans

Total
Value of
Loans
Granted

Pay off old debts

14

14,524

Purchase or repair a house

12

21,080

Purchase land, livestock, or raw materials
for business

17

7,320

Purpose not stated

17

8,020

All loans

59

50,094

Source: PB Vor Limbach
Notes: Money values in Marks. This table summarizes all loans granted between
December 1906 and October 1914. Two loans for which purpose was entered but
illegible are tabulated in the "purpose not stated" category.
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Table 7
Determinants of Loan Security
Binary Probit Estimates; Dependent Variable Equals One if Security is Not Just a Co-signer
Diestedde Cooperative Only
All Occupations

Variable

Farmers only

Estimate

T-Ratio

Estimate

T-ratio

Loan size in Marks

0.000825

2.576

.000063

2.300

Number of years since cooperative formed

0.014814

1.863

.006039

0.670

Dummy = 1 if this is member's first loan

-0.132243

-0.937

-.195346

-1.152

Dummy = 1 if member lives in
Siinnighausen

0.3372833

2.208

.196951

0.973

Dummy = 1 if member lives elsewhere
(not in Diestedde)

0.6021808

2.354

.580112

2.163

Dummy = 1 if member joined in year
cooperative formed

0.085625

0.440

.200442

0.936

Occupation Kolon

-0.341470

-1.189

-.315594

-1.595

Occupation Kotter

0.0012881

0.005

--

--

Occupation Artisan

0.0002574

0.001

--

--

Constant

-0.746030

-2.276

-.532647

-2.327

Log likelihood
Pseudo R-square
Number of observations

-250.016

-169.524

0.055

.040

394

266

Source: Computed from loans database.
Notes: Omitted occupation group is workers and others in the first regression, Kotter in the second.
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Table 8
Loan Size
Quantile (Median) Regression
Diestedde and Hatzfeld Cooperatives
Variable

Estimate

T-ratio

Estimate

T-ratio .

Diestedde
Number of years since cooperative
formed

Hatzfeld

45.53

4.899

16.67

2.768

Dummy = 1 if this is member's
first loan

559.82

3.531

26.67

1.311

Dummy = 1 if member lives in
Siinnighausen

-343.75

-2.132

N.A.

N.A.

Dummy = 1 if member lives
elsewhere (not in main town)

1409.82

2.513

66.67

2.546

Dummy = 1 if member joined in
year cooperative formed

220.53

1.284

26.67

1.550

Occupation Kolon

841.07

2.214

Occupation Kotter

150.00

0.563

---

Occupation Artisan

568.75

1.974

--

----

Constant

-207.14

-0.622

40.0

1.268

Median of dependent variable

1000

140

Pseudo R-square

0.075

0.030

394

310

Number of observations

Source: Computed from loans database.
Notes: Omitted occupation group is workers and others. The Hatzfeld records do not contain
information on occupation. Standard errors estimated by bootstrap.
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FIGU RE 1

Loca tor Map for the Coop erativ es
(Curr ent Bord ers of Germany)
Coop erativ e Loca tions Unde rlined

•
Berli n

•

MUnster
•~Die stedd e

• Hatz feld

•

Frank furt

• Schmelz.

•

Munich
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